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1. Introduction
Although Geographical
Indications (GIs) have a
long history, their diffu-
sion in global food mar-
kets has increased dramati-
cally in the latest 25 years
(Rangnekar, 2004; Profeta
et al., 2009; Blakeney,
2009). For producers, GIs
represent opportunities to
compete locally, nationally
and globally (Bonnet and
Simioni, 2001; Malorgio et
al., 2007; Van Ittersum et
al., 2007). Yet to seize the
opportunity, GI food pro-
ducers face two challen-
ges: 1) collectively, produ-
cers have to provide appro-
priate information about
their GI to consumers to
make them perceive a
superior value vis-à-vis
competing GIs (Bureau
and Valceschini, 2003); 2)
individually, producers ha-
ve to provide appropriate
brand information which
differentiates their own
brand (Aaker, 1991) from
the other individual produ-
cers’ brands within the GI
region. The underlying
problem is that producers
cannot only cooperate with neighbors to jointly strengthen
their collective equity, but they also need to differentiate
and compete with them to
gain access to a restricted
number of buyers (Steen-
kamp and Van Trijp,
1996). This need for si-
multaneous cooperation
and competition among
producers under the same
GI creates a “coopetition
game” among producers
(Bengtsson and Kock,
2000; Tsai 2002). Produ-
cers who focus only on
cooperation with neigh-
bors and avoid competi-
tion may experience los-
ses in terms of profitabili-
ty and access to markets
(Bureau and Valceschini,
2003; Dentoni et al.,
2012). Therefore, this pa-
per tackles a broadly rele-
vant managerial problem:
what is the appropriate in-
formation mix which dif-
ferentiates an individual
producer’s brand with a
GI label to consumer eyes
vis-à-vis other brands ha-
ving the same GI label?
Although urgent for ma-
ny agri-food producers in
regions covered by GIs
(Dentoni and Reardon,
2010), the problem of dif-
ferentiating an individual
brand from other brands within the same GI region has not
been fully tackled in the agricultural marketing literature.
So far, research has found that: 1) a segment of world
consumers develop positive evaluations for products with
GIs for multiple reasons (Van der Lans et al., 2001; Van It-
tersum et al., 2007; Darby et al., 2008; Akaichi et al.,
2012); 2) information plays a role in strengthening consu-
mers’ positive evaluations (Brester and Schroeder, 1995;
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Les producteurs et les distributeurs qui commercialisent les produits alimentaires
sous signe de qualité IG doivent prendre part à un jeu de coopétition de la marque :
ils collaborent les uns avec les autres pour parvenir à une équité collective de l’IG,
mais en même temps, ils sont en concurrence les uns avec les autres pour construire
leur propre marque et créer leurs circuits commerciaux. Dans cette étude, nous
nous sommes appuyés sur une expérience en ligne autour d’une huile d’olive pro-
venant de la région «Riviera Ligure» (dans le nord-ouest de l’Italie), en utilisant un
échantillon approprié, pour évaluer un modèle des chemins. L’objectif était d’ana-
lyser les types et les sources d’information relative à l’IG qui différencient une
marque individuelle par rapport aux autres IG et d’explorer les variables psycho-
logiques et démographiques qui contribuent à déterminer l’impact de l’information
relative à l’IG sur la différenciation de la marque. Le modèle des chemins testé
combine des éléments de la théorie économique du consommateur (Lancaster,
1966) et de la théorie de la formation de l’attitude (Fishbein, 1967 ; Fishbein and
Ajzen, 1975). Les résultats ne peuvent pas être généralisés au-delà du produit et de
l’échantillon observés, mais la méthode reste applicable au niveau de l’industrie
des produits IG comme un outil de recherche sur le consommateur en vue d’établir
des stratégies de communication et marketing.
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Kaiser and Liu, 1998; Chung and Kaiser, 2000) although it
may prevent differentiation (Crespi and Marette, 2002); and
3) the role of information depends on intrinsic product cha-
racteristics (Ehmke et al., 2008) and consumer characteris-
tics (Gao and Schroder, 2009). A gap which persists in lite-
rature is which content and source of information differen-
tiate an individual producer’s brand from the other brands
within the same GI region, and under which conditions. 
To start filling this gap, we developed and tested a set of
hypotheses to analyze the impact of different types and
sources of GI information on consumers’ perceptions, atti-
tudes (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) and willingness to pay a
premium price (WTPP) for a brand relative to its competi-
tors in the market. Hypotheses are tested through path mo-
deling (Hair et al., 2006; Kaplan, 2009). Similarly to other
multivariate statistical approaches, path modeling allows to
explore how multiple factors simultaneously influence the
effect of GI information on consumers’ buying intentions
(Hair et al., 2006). The model is tested with data collected
from 241 graduate students at Michigan State University
(MSU) through an internet-based artefactual experiment on
olive oil from “Riviera Ligure”, a product labeled with a
Protected Designation of Origin (PDO). PDOs are widely
used GIs in the agri-food sector and regulated by the Euro-
pean Union (EU) policy framework. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section synthesizes the literature on GIs, on generic versus
brand GI information and on the links between consumer
psychology and economics. Hypotheses are developed in
section 3, methods are introduced in section 4 and results a-
re presented and discussed in section 5; section 6 conclu-
des.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Linking Theory of Attitude Formation and
Consumer Economics
The theoretical framework tested in this research is roo-
ted in the Lancastrian approach to consumer economics
(Lancaster, 1966) and in the psychology theory of attitude
formation (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). According to Lan-
caster (1966), products possess multiple characteristics
which are shared by multiple products and that products in
aggregate can possess characteristics different from those
pertaining to the goods separately. Product characteristics
are categorized in search, experience and credence attribu-
tes (Nelson, 1970; Darby and Karni, 1973). Search attribu-
tes (e.g. price and color) can be assessed before purchase
and consumption; experience attributes (e.g. flavor) can be
assessed only during consumption; credence attributes (e.g.
origin) cannot be assessed either before or after consump-
tion. Linking consumer economics and marketing, Zei-
thaml (1988) generalized that consumer perceptions of pro-
duct attributes lead to quality expectations and consumer
value. In the case of products with credence and experien-
ce attributes, the presence of effective signals (Akerlof,
1970) increases consumer quality expectations and percei-
ved product value. In the present context of this study, GIs
can be viewed as a distinctive signal of the origin attributes
of the product (Marette et al., 2008; Moschini et al., 2008).
Such a signal of origin enhances both consumer quality ex-
pectations and their perceived value directly (Van der Lans
et al., 2001). Consumer willingness to pay (WTP) is an es-
tablished measure of perceived product value elicited
through choice experiments (e.g. Carlsson et al., 2007).
Willingness to pay a premium (WTPP) has been common-
ly used to estimate the differential consumer value for a
product versus others (e.g. Govindasamy and Italia, 1999;
Chiang et al., 2012). Consumer WTP is one of the dimen-
sions of consumer buying intentions (Eagly and Chaicken,
1980) and an outcome of brand equity (Aaker, 1991).
The relationship between consumer buying intentions, at-
titudes towards a product and evaluation and beliefs of pro-
duct attributes has been generalized in psychology as the
learning theory of attitude formation (Fishbein, 1967; Fish-
bein and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) and wide-
ly applied to marketing (Lutz, 1991). Consumer attitudes
towards a product are formed by the interaction between the
evaluation of its attributes and the belief (or perception) that
the attribute is associated to the product (Fishbein, 1967).
Furthermore, the impact of consumer attitudes towards a
product on buying intentions depends on 1) their subjective
norms, that is, to what extent they are influenced in their ac-
tions by the judgment of significant others (Fishbein and
Ajzen, 1975); 2) their perceived self-efficacy, that is, to
what extent they are able to accomplish the purchase once
they have formed their intention to buy; and 3) the extent
that the buying intention corresponds to behavior in terms
of action, target, context, time-frame and/or specificity
(Sheppard et al., 1988). When receiving and processing
new information about a product, consumers update their
evaluations and beliefs related to the products, their attitu-
des and their buying intentions (Lutz, 1991; Keller, 1993).
This research analyzes the different impacts of generic and
brand GI information on consumer beliefs, attitudes and
buying intentions (specifically WTPP) through the hypo-
theses developed as follows.
2.2. GIs and The Role of Information
Similarly to trademarks, GIs are distinctive signs which
allow the identification of products on the food market (Ad-
dor and Grazioli, 2002). Yet, unlike trademarks GIs identi-
fy food products as originating from a particular geographic
region (Babcock and Clemens, 2004). In the EU, Appella-
tion of Controlled Origin (AOCs, from the French Appella-
tions d’Origine Contrôlée), PDOs and Protected Geogra-
phical Indications (PGIs) are widely used GIs in the food
sector and all regulated by a common policy framework
(Sylvander et al., 1999; Barham, 2003; Malorgio et al.,
2007; Marette et al., 2008). In the rest of the world, GIs a-
re generally regulated by private groups of producers and
local public and/or private institutions within the frame-
work of national policies (Giovannucci et al., 2010). For
example, in the United States appellations do not generally
imply additional information about variety or production
methods (Goodhue et al., 2004). Differently from Country-
of-Origin Labels (COOL) in the US (Loureiro and Umber-
ger, 2005), GIs represent a smaller geographical area of ori-
gin than a country and producers must demonstrate that a
link between the territory and the product flavor exist (Me-
napace et al., 2011).
GI labels are designed to guarantee consumers that food
has a specific origin and follows a production process ba-
sed on established codes of practice (Sylvander et al., 1999;
Fandos and Flavian, 2006). As such, GI labels act as signals
of product quality in multiple dimensions, including both
credence attributes (Darby and Karni, 1973) and experien-
ce attributes (Nelson, 1970; Anania and Nisticò, 2004). In
other words, GI labels aim to reduce imperfect information
between sellers and buyers about product attributes (Cas-
well and Mojduszka, 1996). Codes of practice establishing
the production and product requirements of GI products act
as mechanisms to make the certification credible and trust-
worthy (Anania and Nisticò, 2004; Moschini et al., 2008),
to embed complex quality information into collectively ac-
cepted standards (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005) and to increase
trust among producers under the same GI.
To be effective signals of both food credence and expe-
rience attributes, GI labels need to 1) build reputation based
on past customer experience (Shapiro, 1982) and to 2) pro-
vide appropriate information to customers (Menapace and
Moschini, 2011; Saak, 2012). Most famous GIs (such as
Parma Ham, Roquefort cheese or Champagne) naturally en-
joy reputation based on their past history and international
recognition. Conversely, more recently established and less
recognized GIs need to mainly rely on providing appro-
priate information to consumers (Bureau and Valceschini,
2003). In both cases, information about the GI plays a key
role in shaping consumers’ perceptions, expectations of
quality, and buying intentions (Caswell and Mojduszka,
1996). As they manage a collective rather than individual
signal of quality, producers under the GI labels have to pro-
vide customers with a consistent and appropriate set of in-
formation about the GI (Costanigro et al., 2010). This is
challenging because 1) coordinating multiple producers un-
der a joint marketing and communication strategy is costly,
especially when the producer group is heterogeneous (Den-
toni et al., 2012), and 2) producers are generally not aware
of how customers respond to different types and sources of
information about the GI. In the wine sector, where multi-
ple individual brands under the same GI have co-existed
and competed for longer time than in other food sectors
(Speed, 1998), researchers have found that individual
brands under the GI label become more impactful on WTP
than GIs themselves when the product price is higher (Co-
stanigro et al., 2010). However, heterogeneous market and
product characteristics across GI producers may lead to
sub-optimal levels of joint investments (Costanigro et al.,
2012). Therefore, individual producers still find it particu-
larly challenging to balance an appropriate marketing mix
between generic promotion of the GI label versus brand
communication of their individual product under the GI.
This research aims to contribute tackling this challenge.
2.3. Types and Sources of GI Information
Two different types of information about the GI (or “GI
information”) can be distinguished based on the wide exis-
ting literature and empirical evidence: generic information
about the GI (or “generic GI information”) and brand in-
formation about the GI (or “brand GI information”). Both
generic and brand GI information highlight the positive at-
tributes of GI products and aim to increase consumer atti-
tudes and buying intentions for GI products. Yet, generic
and brand GI information reflect two different though com-
plementary goals of producers. This difference in goals can
be described both in terms of the Lancastrian approach to
consumer economics theory and in terms of psychology
theory of attitude formation. From an economic standpoint,
generic GI information aims to increase consumer willin-
gness-to-pay (WTP) and in turn create value for the entire
GI production, independently from the individual brand sel-
ling under the GI label. Conversely, brand GI information
aims to create value for an individual producer selling the
GI label. From a psychological standpoint, generic GI in-
formation influences consumer buying intentions by in-
creasing consumer positive evaluations for the GI attributes
that in turn increase their attitudes towards GI products.
Following the example by Crespi and Marette (2002), ge-
neric GI information about California raisins aims at in-
creasing consumers’ evaluative judgments for the “Califor-
nia” attribute when associated to the product “raisins”. At
the same time, generic GI information aims at increasing
consumers’ beliefs that the attribute “California” means
“good flavor” or, for example, “eco-friendly”. In contrast,
brand GI information influences consumer buying inten-
tions by increasing consumer perception that one individual
brand has stronger GI attributes and/or other unique positi-
ve attributes complementary with the GI. For example,
brand information about “Sun Maid Raisins” aims at in-
creasing consumers’ association between Sun Maid and Ca-
lifornia, as well as other favorable associations such as bet-
ween Sun Maid and “good flavor” or between Sun Maid
and “sunny land”. Based on this mix of common and diffe-
rent goals of the two types of GI information, producers fa-
ce brand coopetition and need to find an appropriate balan-
ce between providing generic versus brand GI information
to consumers. 
Commonly used marketing and communication activities
provide either generic or brand GI information, or in some
cases both. By definition, generic advertising (Brester and
Schroeder, 1995; Kaiser and Liu, 1998; Chung and Kaiser,
2000; Crespi and Marette, 2002) provides generic GI infor-
mation only. Place branding (Kotler et al., 1993; Iversen
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and Hem, 2008) includes joint activities by consortiums of
producers providing generic GI information as well as indi-
vidual activities by companies providing both generic and
brand GI information. In other words, individual producers
participating in place branding are required to provide
brand GI information which complements generic GI infor-
mation and aims to increase place brand equity. Differently
from GIs, 1) place brands do not focus on a specific product
but on a wide umbrella or products and services offered by
a region and 2) are not regulated by EU or national policy
frameworks but are usually registered as trademarks.
Conversely, brand advertising, third-party private certifica-
tions, third-party endorsements and appraisals are common
activities and resources to provide brand GI information
and develop individual brand equity (Aaker, 1991; Keller,
1993). That is, these tools allow GI producers to develop
consumer perceptions and evaluations for their brand
beyond the generic GI product. Furthermore, producers wi-
thout GI labels also make use of these marketing commu-
nication tools to create consumer perceptions of origin at-
tribute often based on stereotypes (for example, Guinness
beer from Ireland or Zespri kiwifruit from New Zealand)
(Pappu et al., 2007). Brand advertising through mass media
(Pappu et al., 2007) and private third-party certification
systems (Farina and Reardon, 2000) have been often proved
to be effective in the marketplace. Yet, they require a finan-
cial investment that is unbearable by many small and me-
dium agri-food firms attempting to differentiate their pro-
duct from competitors. Third-party endorsements and ap-
praisals (Dean, 1999) from actors with high status in the
marketplace (Podolny, 1993) – such as chefs, cultural asso-
ciations, travel and cuisine guides linked to a particular ter-
ritory and food product – are financially accessible means
to provide brand GI information (Dentoni and Reardon,
2010).
Different types of GI information do not always cor-
respond to different sources of GI information. On one
hand, brand GI information is released uniquely by indivi-
dual producers to develop and manage their own brand to
differentiate it from others with or without the same GI la-
bel. On the other hand, generic GI information is usually
provided by multiple sources: either a private firm, a group
of firms under a cooperative or consortium representing the
GI product or a public entity representing the firms within
a GI region. This implies that individual producers have to
balance the provision of generic and brand GI information
to consumers. Through the hypotheses developed, this re-
search aims to provide a framework for producers to find
the appropriate balance.
3. Hypotheses Development
To start analyzing which type (generic versus brand GI
information) and source (private versus collective) of infor-
mation differentiates an individual producer’s brand from
the other brands within the same GI region, we develop the
following set of assumptions and hypotheses. First, we
hypothesize that generic GI information – either provided
by an individual producer with the GI or a collective group
of producers representing the GI – has no significantly higher
impact on consumer WTPP for an individual producer’s
brand relative to the other brands under the same GI. In other
words, we hypothesize that generic GI information does not
create any brand differentiation, no matter who the source of
the information is. This hypothesis is consistent with pre-
vious literature finding that generic advertising hampers
brand differentiation (Kaiser and Liu, 1998, Crespi and Ma-
rette, 2002). Therefore, two hypotheses are stated as:
H1. Generic GI information provided by an individual
producer does not differentiate its brand from the other
brands under the same GI in terms of consumer WTPP.
H2. Generic GI information provided by an individual
producer does not have a higher impact on consumer
WTPP than the same generic GI information provided by
a collective group of producers under the same GI.
If supported by empirical data, these hypotheses would
lead to the conclusion that companies investing in provi-
ding generic GI information to consumers would coopera-
te, but not compete in the “brand coopetition” game of GI
promotion. Moreover, assuming that the costs of providing
generic GI information are cheaper when shared within a
collective group of GI producers than when covered by one
individual producer only, empirical support to these hypo-
theses would lead to the conclusion that it is more profita-
ble to provide generic GI information to consumers through
a collective group of producers rather than attempting to
provide it individually.
Conversely, we hypothesize that brand GI information
has a higher positive impact on consumer perceptions, atti-
tudes and WTPP towards an individual producer brand than
generic GI information. The hypothesis would hold only if
consumers have been previously exposed to some generic
GI information, no matter what the source is; if consumers
ignore the place of origin represented by the GI, then
consumers could not form an evaluation for the origin attri-
bute of the product and so there could be no impact on
consumer attitudes (Fishbein, 1967; Lutz, 1991). Therefore,
a third hypothesis is stated as:
H3. Once generic GI information has been previously
provided to consumers, brand GI information provided
by a firm does differentiate its individual brand from
other brands under the same GI in terms of consumer
WTPP.
If supported by empirical data, this third hypothesis
would lead to the conclusion that companies investing in
brand GI information would effectively compete in the “co-
opetition game” of GI promotion. Assuming that the costs
of providing generic versus brand GI information were the
same for an individual producer, then empirical evidence
supporting this hypothesis would imply that it is more pro-
fitable to provide brand GI information to consumers rather
than generic GI information.
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4. Methods
4.1. Sample and Product Selection
To test our hypotheses, we collected data through an
internet-based experiment administered to 241 graduate
students from MSU. When sending an e-mail advertisement
to recruit students to undertake the test, we called for stu-
dents that “are interested in food from different places and
cultures” in order to gain a sample with higher involvement
for specialty foods with place-of-origin attributes than the
average US college students. Therefore, this sample is pur-
posively not representative of the US college populations
nor of the US population. As the main goal of this investi-
gation is testing theory rather than collecting market infor-
mation (Calder et al., 1981; Lynch, 1999), we selected a
sample from a fairly homogeneous sample. This was
convenient to test hypotheses in laboratory settings and far
from the noise of real market conditions, which increases
variability due to the influence of external and uncontrolla-
ble factors (Calder et al., 1981; Lynch, 1999; Winer, 1999).
Out of the 241 students recruited, 80% are from the US.
The remaining 20% mostly comes from Asia and Latin
America, while only few participants are from Europe and
Africa. On average, international participants have spent th-
ree years in the US. Females compose around 70% of our
sample.
We selected extra-virgin olive oil from Riviera Ligure
(Italy) as a product of interest based on four key criteria: 1)
the product is unknown to our sample when associated to a
specific place of origin (Riviera Ligure), although the coun-
try where the place is nested (Italy) may be well known. In
this way, we attempt to give information treatments to
respondents who have very weak prior beliefs regarding the
products associated to the GI “Riviera Ligure”, as respon-
dents’ prior beliefs may largely vary according to their in-
dividual experiences (John et al., 1986); 2) the product is
relevant for the majority of respondents, although their fa-
miliarity towards the product may vary significantly; 3) the
product is commonly promoted in association with its ori-
gin attributes; 4) the product is largely used in experiments
in consumer economics and marketing (Van del Lans et al.,
2001; Scarpa and Del Giudice, 2004; Caporale et al., 2006;
Finardi et al,. 2009; Chan-Halbrendt et al., 2010; Delgado
and Guinard, 2011; Menapace et al., 2011) to allow mea-
ningful integration with the extant literature. Within the ob-
tained sample, 85% of our respondents consume olive oil at
least once a month. Moreover, they have positive initial at-
titudes towards olive oil, as their average attitude is 6.1
points out of 7 when asked: “How would you describe your
attitude towards extra-virgin olive oil?” Only four indivi-
duals in our sample (0.02% of our sample) have heard be-
fore about olive oil from Riviera Ligure, while 65% of our
sample has heard about Italian olive oil in advance. There-
fore, we have confirmed that, overall, the selected sample
has a basic knowledge of and involvement with olive oil as
generic product but has weak prior beliefs on olive oil from
Riviera Ligure. 
4.2. Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted in June 2009. Respon-
dents were recruited through an email advertisement by the
researchers from the university email address lists. Each
respondent undertook a questionnaire divided into an initial
demographics section plus two sections with information
treatments and measurements. In the initial demographics
section, respondents were asked preliminary questions
about their gender and nationality, as well as their initial at-
titude towards and their use of olive oil. In the first section,
we collect data on the impact of generic GI information to
test hypotheses H1 and H2. Respondents were divided into
four groups: 1) the first group received a treatment with ge-
neric GI information from an individual producer and then
their beliefs, attitudes and WTPP for an individual brand of
the producer providing the information were measured; 2)
the second group received the same treatment (generic GI
information from an individual producer) as the first group,
but their beliefs, attitudes and WTPP were measured for a
different brand with the same GI label; 3) the third group
received generic GI information from a collective group of
producers and then their beliefs, attitudes and buying inten-
tions for the same individual brand as in the first group we-
re measured; 4) the fourth group acted as a control group
and received only a brief description of the extra-virgin oli-
ve oil product without any claim related to the place of ori-
gin and then their beliefs, attitudes and buying intentions
for the same individual brands as in the first and third group
were measured. 
Consistently with the definition of generic GI informa-
tion (section 2.3), the first two treatments were manipulated
with one 80-word positive description of the product asso-
ciated with Riviera Ligure together with the supporting GI
label of the product (PDO Riviera Ligure) and a picture.
The description was adapted from three different promotion
messages used by Riviera Ligure producers in the market-
place and highlights the natural qualities of Riviera Ligure
in association with traditional olive oil production and the
meaning of the PDO (Figure 1a). The third piece of infor-
mation involved a 130-word positive description of the
PDO Consortium controlling and promoting the Riviera Li-
gure olive oil, plus the same highlight of the Riviera Ligu-
re natural beauties and of the meaning of PDO (Figure 1b).
Both the pieces of information and the picture were pre-tes-
ted to make sure that respondents had not statistically si-
gnificant differences in beliefs and attitudes after being ex-
posed to these treatments only. 
Respondents’ belief strength of the association between
the individual brand and the GI label was measured with a
single seven-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to
strongly agree to a statement such as “I believe that “Brand
A” extra-virgin olive oil is obtained from the most careful-
ly selected olives of Riviera Ligure” consistently with Ea-
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gly and Chaiken (1993). In this case, “Brand A” is the indi-
vidual brand, while “PDO Riviera Ligure” extra-virgin oli-
ve oil is the product with the GI label. Respondents’ attitu-
des were elicited by asking the question “How would you
describe your attitude towards “Brand A” extra-virgin olive
oil from Riviera Ligure?” and then measured with a seven-
point semantic differential scale from very negative to very
positive. As discussed in psychology (Eagly and Chaiken,
1993; Chaiken and Stangor, 1987), attitudes can be measu-
red as one-dimensional variables when related to abstract
objects that do not cause a non-verbal reaction by respon-
dents. Finally, respondents’ WTPP was measured with an
individual question such as “Would you pay a premium to
have “Brand A” extra-virgin olive oil rather than another
olive oil brand from Riviera Ligure?” where the possible
answers were “yes”, “no” or “I don’t know”. Studies asses-
sing buying intentions such as WTP and WTPP through ar-
tefactual experiments with a convenient sample rather than
actual consumers suffer of hypothetical bias (Lusk and
Hudson, 2004). Such a bias usually inflates the real pre-
mium that respondents would pay in the marketplace (Lusk
and Hudson, 2004); thus it is taken into account in the re-
sult discussion.
In the second section of the questionnaire, we collected
data on the differential impact of brand GI information and
generic GI information on consumers’ beliefs, attitudes and
WTPP. First, every respondent across the four groups re-
ceived generic GI information before being administered
with the next set of treatments, including the fourth group
that did not receive it beforehand. Respondents were then
divided into two groups: 1) the first group was given ano-
ther 150-word paragraph including generic GI information
by an individual producer and another pre-tested picture.
This paragraph emphasizes the qualities and history of the
Riviera Ligure region and the attributes of its “taggiasca va-
riety” olives, which provide flavor to its olive oil (see Fi-
gure 1c). This piece of information was also adapted from
existing promotional messages of olive oil producers in the
marketplace. Then their beliefs, attitudes and buying inten-
tions for that firm’s brand were measured again; 2) the se-
cond group was instead given brand GI information from
the same individual producer and another pre-tested pictu-
re. Consistently with its definition (section 2.3), brand GI
information was manipulated with a 120-word description
including a set of brand endorsements. In particular, the
description mentions that the brand from Riviera Ligure is
used by chefs in three prestigious Italian restaurants and
one luxury train restaurant. Moreover, it claims that the
brand is sold in two famous stores in London and Paris and
one gourmet food store chain in US. Finally, it highlights
that the brand received a special mention by a famous Eu-
ropean restaurant guide (see Figure 1d).
4.3. The Model
We used path analysis as methodology to test hypotheses.
Relatively to linear regressions, path models involve a set of
multiple equations linking variables such that the dependent
variable in one equation is the independent variable in the fol-
lowing equation (Hair et al., 2006). Relatively to structural
Figure 1. Set of Treatments Representing Generic and Brand GI Information
Figure 1a. Generic GI information from individual producer.
Riviera Ligure is an astonishing Italian region where mountains touch the
sea, little fishers’ villages keep their ancient beauty and olive trees grow in
stone-made terraces. “Brand A” (brand name omitted) extra-virgin olive oil
carries a Protected Designation of Origin (PDO). Contrary to others in the
market, PDO olive oils are subject to origin control, documented traceabili-
ty and chemical-physical analyses. Only upon completion of this sequence
of controls an olive oil may bear that precious European Community label.
Figure 1b - Generic GI information from a collective group of producers.
Founded in 2001, the Riviera Ligure olive oil Consortium, with the
strength deriving from the participation of the olive growers, presses
and bottlers, is enthusiast to promote and protect the reputation of the
extra-virgin olive oil from Riviera Ligure.
Riviera Ligure is an astonishing Italian region where mountains touch
the sea, little fishers’ villages keep their ancient beauty and olive trees
grow in stone-made terraces. Extra-virgin olive oil from Riviera Ligu-
re is certified as Protected Designation of Origin (PDO), thus control-
led and promoted by the Riviera Ligure olive oil Consortium. Contra-
ry to others in the market, PDO olive oils are subject to origin control,
documented traceability and chemical-physical analyses. Only upon
completion of this sequence of controls an olive oil may bear that pre-
cious European Community label.
Figure 1c - Another generic GI information from individual producer.
From Capo Cervo to the border with France, Riviera Ligure is a conti-
nuum of bays, traditional ports and rocks on the sea that suddenly be-
come valleys and mountain peaks.
Riviera Ligure’s history is rooted in a tradition in which the production of
olive oil has played a central role for thousands of years. The “taggiasca”
tree produces a unique olive and imparts Riviera Ligure olive oil with a
full, delicate and well-rounded flavor, and a deep color. Here in Riviera Li-
gure, everything is different. Time does not matter. Also people are diffe-
rent: they built miles of stone walls to sustain stripes of cultivations all
along the steepest mountains. They found the space for little squares of
land among mountains, and took care of the hard soil for centuries to plant
olives. And this produced a wonder: the extra-virgin olive oil. In this ma-
gnificent land, Riviera Ligure, the “Brand B” family produces its olive oil.
Figure 1d - Brand GI information from individual producer.
The Cipriani Hotel in Venice, the Orient Express luxury train, the
Splendido Hotel in Portofino, the Quisisana Hotel in Capri… “Brand
B” (brand name omitted) is a delicate extra-virgin olive oil from Ri-
viera Ligure chosen by the best chefs and the most elegant hotels in
Italy. “Brand B” has also received a special mention from the famous
Michelin restaurant guide. It has been already chosen by top gourmet
shops such as Whole Foods, Harrods in London and La Grande Epi-
cerie in Paris. This is the result of four decades of work and passion for
olives of the “Brand B” family, that obtains their olive oil from the
healthiest and more carefully selected olives of Riviera Ligure.
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equation models (SEM), path analysis employs only indivi-
dual measures rather than latent factors reflecting multiple
measures (Hair et al., 2006). The relationship among the va-
riables can be interpreted as cause-effect or as a simple asso-
ciation depending on the theory driving the data interpretation
(Kaplan, 2009). Then, we selected path analysis because of
two distinctive features: 1) it provides a means to assess a set
of relationships simultaneously rather than in separate analy-
ses (Hair et al., 2006); 2) it allows exploring mediators and
moderators which may reduce the heterogeneity of the va-
riance of the dependent variables (Kaplan, 2009). In the
context of this study, path analysis allows deepening the result
insights by: 1) testing if brand GI information leads to brand
differentiation relatively to generic GI information, as well as
2) exploring which psychological factors (consumer beliefs
and attitudes) mediate and which conditions (consumer de-
mographics) moderate such a brand differentiation effect.
The generic and brand GI information are administered
treatments in the experiment, so they represent exogenous
binary variables taking “0” or “1” values in three similar
path models. Specifically, the three path models can gene-
rically be described as: 
(1) BELSEL = β 11INFO + β 12DEM + β13 INIT + ε1
(2) BELFLAV = β 21INFO + β 22 BELSEL + β 23DEM + β24
INIT + ε2
(3) ATT = β 31INFO + β 32 BELSEL + β 33 BELFLAV +
β 34DEM + β35INIT + ε3
(4) WTPP = β 41ATT + β 42BELSEL + β 43 BELSEL +
β 44DEM + β45INIT + ε4,
where BELSEL stands for respondents’ beliefs that the
branded product is from the most carefully selected product
from the place-of-origin1, BELFLAV means respondents’
beliefs that the branded product has a good flavor, ATT
stands for respondents’ attitudes towards the brand and
WTPP stands for the willingness to pay a premium price for
the brand relatively to other brands from the same place of
origin1. Moreover, DEM and INIT are vectors of exogenous
variables in the path models including respectively gender,
nationality, initial attitudes and habits towards the products.
Finally, the meaning of the treatment variable INFO varies ac-
cording to the three hypotheses: in the first path model, the
variable INFO with value “0” represents the impact of gene-
ric GI information from an individual producer on its own
brand, while the value “1” represents the impact of generic GI
information on another brand with the same GI label. In the
second path model, the value “0” of the INFO variable repre-
sents generic GI information from an individual producer and
the value “1” represents generic GI information from a col-
lective group of producers. In the third path model, the value
“0” of the variable INFO represents generic GI information
from an individual producer, while the value “1” represents
brand GI information. 
The relationships among these variables are estimated
through path coefficients (βs). These are standardized re-
gression coefficients showing the direct effect of an inde-
pendent variable on a dependent variable in the path model.
Thus when the model has two or more causal variables,
path coefficients are partial regression coefficients which
measure the extent of the effect of one variable on another
in the path model controlling for other prior variables. As
an intercept is not usually included in path models, βs des-
cribe deviations from the mean (Bentler, 2006). The resi-
dual error terms or disturbance terms, described by ε1, ε2, ε3
and ε4 reflect unexplained variance plus measurement error.
Given the number of parameters to be estimated and the de-
grees of freedom for each model, we decide to select a to-
tal sample size close to 240. We choose this size with the
rule of thumb that each path model should be based ideally
on 10 observations (Kline, 1998) and at least on 5 observa-
tions (Bentler and Chou, 1987) per degree of freedom.
The path analysis is conducted with the computer packa-
ge EQS 6.1 (Bentler, 2006). Satorra-Bentler robust maxi-
mum likelihood estimation (MLE) is used to obtain path
coefficients, as various binary categorical variables are pre-
sent in the model, including INFO, gender and nationality
(Bentler, 2006). The dependent variable WTPP is binary but
has been treated as continuous in these path models. This
gives the opportunity of analyzing the impact of endoge-
nous variables on WTPP, which would have not been pos-
sible otherwise. Treating dependent binary variables as
continuous is generally inappropriate and can lead to mea-
ningless interpretations (MacCallum et al., 2002), such as
estimated probabilities that “1” happens below zero or abo-
ve 1. However, the problem is limited when the sample si-
ze is small relative to the degrees of freedom and the quan-
tity of “1” within the sample is low (Bentler, 2006) as it is
the sample under study. Furthermore, we tested and confir-
med the stability of the path models by comparing the re-
sults with and without the equation (4) with WTPP as bina-
ry variable. Consistently with the established assumptions
normality of distribution and continuity of Likert and se-
mantic differential scales in path analysis and SEM (Ka-
plan, 2009), we modeled the seven-point Likert and seman-
tic differential scales as continuous variables too.
5. Results and Discussion
5.1. The Impact of Generic GI information on
Brand Differentiation
Results show that the generic GI information about PDO
Riviera Ligure olive oil does have a significantly higher im-
pact on respondents’ WTPP for the individual producer
1 We decided to model WTPP as a binary variable, where the va-
lue “1” stands for respondents that are willing to pay a premium
price, where the value “0” stands for respondents that have ans-
wered either “no” or “I don’t know”. We decide to count the “I do-
n’t know” responses as “0” values because, although the percen-
tage of participants responding “I don’t know” is around 30%, from
a t-test we found no significant variation in the change of this per-
centage across groups.
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brand of the firm releasing the information (say, “Brand A”)
relatively to other brands from the same place of origin
(say, “Brand B”) (Figure 2). The direct effect of a firm gi-
ving attribute information on respondents’ WTPP for
“Brand B” relatively to “Brand A” is -0.10 percentage
points, while its indirect effect is equal to -0.05 percentage
points (Table 1). As common in path analysis (Bentler,
2006), we computed the indirect effect as the sum of the
products of all the path coefficients linking the information
treatment to the willingness to pay a premium for the
brands. The sum between the indirect and the direct effect
results in a total causal effect of -0.15 percentage points
(Table 1). This means that when generic GI information is
provided by the firm owning “Brand A”, the expected per-
centage of respondents that are willing to pay a premium
for “Brand B” is 15% lower than the mean (25%), that is
25%-15%=10%. The overall fit of this model is excellent,
with Comparative Fit Index (CFI) =1.00 and Root Mean
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)=0.00. To assess
the overall fit of the model with the data, RMSEA and CFI
both analyze the discrepancy between the hypothesized
model and the population covariance matrix adjusting for
sample size issues. Models with CFI > 0.9 and RMSEA <
0.1 are considered having acceptable fit, while models with
CFI > 0.95 and RMSEA < 0.05 have a good fit (Kaplan
2009). Chi-square (χ2) p-value is 0.76 with 12 degrees of
freedom (d.f.), confirming that the overall fit is good.
The analysis of the mediators of the impact of generic GI
information on brand differentiation is synthesized in three
points. First, respondents perceive more that “Brand A” is
selected with quality standards relatively to “Brand B” (-
0.21 points) and, overall, have developed higher attitudes
towards “Brand A” than towards “Brand B” (-0.15 points,
Table 1). Second, respondents perceive that “Brand B” has
a better flavor than “Brand A” (0.15 points). This is quite
surprising and may reflect consumer perception that produ-
cers who do not invest on brand advertising (such as “Brand
B” producer) have more focus on the tangible product attri-
butes such as flavor. Third, consumer beliefs have a positi-
ve influence on their attitudes and WTPP (Table 1). These
results show that the effect of generic GI information on
consumer WTPP for producer’s brand is mainly direct (see
“Direct” and “Indirect Effect of INFO on WTPP” in Table
1 and Figure 2). Consistently with Fishbein (1967) and Ea-
gly and Chaicken (1993), a direct effect of information on
WTPP represents an “affective” reaction (Eagly and Chaic-
ken, 1993) rather than an indirect effect mediated by
respondent beliefs, which reflects a rational decision-ma-
king process based on formed perceptions. The analysis of
the demographic moderators of the impact of generic GI in-
formation on brand differentiation show that females take in-
stinctive decisions more than males in their evaluation of the
two brands: the impact of generic GI information is signifi-
cantly higher on female respondents’ attitudes and WTPP for
“Brand A” than for “Brand B” (Table 1). Instead, males take
a more “rational” approach to their evaluation of the two
brands, as the impact of generic GI information is higher on
male respondents’ beliefs. 
Therefore, overall data evidence does not support the first
hypothesis (H1) in the case of PDO Riviera Ligure olive oil. An
olive oil firm releasing generic GI information which highlights
the natural qualities of Riviera Ligure in association with tradi-
tional olive oil production and the meaning of the PDO (such as
in Figure 1a) may expect to gain an advantage in terms of WTPP.
In other words, by releasing this type of generic GI information
to consumers who do not have prior knowledge of Riviera Li-
gure (such as MSU graduate students who showed interest in
international food and cuisine), a company effectively “coope-
tes”. It cooperates by promoting the entire GI region, while it
competes by differentiating itself from the other brands. 
5.2. The Impact of Generic GI information from
a Collective Organization
Results show that generic GI information provided by an in-
dividual producer of PDO Riviera Ligure olive oil has a si-
gnificantly higher impact on respondents’ WTPP for its own
brand than generic GI information provided by a collective
group of producers under the GI label (Figure 3). The overall
effect of generic GI information from an individual firm on
respondents’ WTPP for its brand is +0.31 percentage points,
that is the sum of the direct effect (+0.21) and the indirect ef-
fect mediated by respondents’ beliefs and attitudes (+0.10)
(Table 2). Therefore, when generic GI information is provided
by an individual producer, the expected percentage of respon-
dents that have WTPP for its brand is 31% higher than the
mean (20%), that is 20%+31%=51%. As the overall fit of this
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Figure 2 - The Impact of Generic GI Information from Individual Pro-
ducer on WTPP vis-à-vis Competing Brand with same GI label. 
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model is good (CFI=0.98, RMSEA=0.05; χ2 p-value= 0.19),
we conclude that generic GI information by an individual pro-
ducer significantly differentiates its brand relatively to the same
information from a collective group of producers. Respondents’
beliefs as mediators have the same role as in the first path mo-
del: beliefs in the selection according to quality standards are hi-
gher when the individual producer provides the generic GI in-
formation, while beliefs in the product quality are higher when
the same information is provided by a collective group of GI
producers (Table 2). Conversely, demographic moderators play
an insignificant role in this path model (Table 2).
Based on this result, we conclude that data evidence does
not support the second hypothesis (H2) in the case of PDO Ri-
viera Ligure olive oil. An olive oil firm from Riviera Ligure
may expect to obtain a price premium for its brand when it re-
leases generic GI information by itself rather than when the
same piece of information – with an added description of the
Consortium controlling and promoting the quality of the oli-
ve oil (such as in Figure 1b) - is released by a collective group
of producers under the same GI. Thus, providing generic GI
information as collective group of producers may be a way to
cooperate in promoting Riviera Ligure to consumer with litt-
le prior knowledge, yet it is not an effective way to compe-
te with other brands within Riviera Ligure. 
5.3. The Impact of Brand GI infor-
mation
Results show that brand GI information
leads to a significantly higher impact on
respondents’ WTPP for a PDO Riviera Ligu-
re olive oil brand than generic GI informa-
tion (Figure 4). The total causal effect of
brand GI information is +0.27 percentage
points, that is, the sum of the direct effect
(+0.17) and the indirect effect mediated by
respondents’ beliefs and attitudes (+0.10)
(Table 3). Thus, when an individual firm
provides brand information to a group of
respondents, the expected percentage of
respondents that are willing to pay a pre-
mium for its brand is 27% higher than the
expected percentage across groups (17%),
that is 17%+27%=44%. CFI=0.93 and
RMSEA=0.075 indicate that the model has
an acceptable overall fit with the data. As it
is sensitive to sample size relatively to a hi-
gher number of d.f.=23, χ2 p-value is not
considered for this third model.
Furthermore, results show that respondent-
s’ beliefs play a key mediating role, while at-
titudes do not (Table 3 and Figure 4). That is,
when receiving brand GI information,
respondents form their buying intentions in
terms of WTPP through a rational process ra-
ther than through an affective or instinctive
positive reaction towards that brand. As re-
gards the variables moderating the impact of brand GI in-
formation on brand differentiation, 1) female respondents,
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Table 1 - The impact of Generic GI Information from individual producer on WTPP for “Brand A”
vis-a-vis competing brand with the same GI label (“Brand B”).
Figure 3 - The Impact of Generic GI Information from Individual Producer vis-à-vis from
Collective Group of Producers on WTPP.
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2) with more familiarity for olive oil and 3) with higher in-
itial attitudes towards olive oil, are more likely to take a ra-
tional rather than instinctive approach mediated by their
perceptions (Table 3). This reflects the fact that these
respondents have higher ability and motivation to rational-
ly process the brand GI information when forming their be-
havioral intentions.
We conclude that data evidence does support our third
hypothesis (H3) in the case of PDO Riviera Ligure olive
oil. Therefore, an olive oil producer from Riviera Ligure
may expect to obtain a higher consumer percentage of
consumer WTPP for its brand when providing brand GI in-
formation rather than generic GI information when consu-
mers already have received prior generic GI information.
Thus, in this case a brand GI information is a more effecti-
ve tool to compete with other Riviera Ligure producers than
generic GI information. In this research, brand GI informa-
tion reported a large set of brand endorsements from chefs
in prestigious hotels and luxury trains, buyers in famous
international stores and gourmet food chains, and one well-
known restaurant guide (Figure 1d). This is a quite ambi-
tious set of brand endorsements for an oil olive producer to
achieve (Dentoni and Reardon, 2010), and we expect that
producers displaying a smaller set of endorsements may not
achieve the same differentiation in the marketplace. 
6. Conclusions
Agricultural marketing literature large-
ly analyzed the effects of generic adverti-
sing and collective certification schemes
on consumers’ evaluations for food pro-
ducts under GI label, but rarely studied
how producers can create a competitive
advantage for their individual brand rela-
tively to the other brands within the same
place of origin. Yet, food producers often
have to face “coopetition” (Bengtsson
and Kock, 2000; Tsai, 2002) in the mar-
ketplace, that is, they have to cooperate
to build a collective GI reputation and at
the same time compete for limited buyer-
s’ shelf space.
Building upon the theory of attitude
formation (Fishbein, 1967; Fishbein and
Ajzen, 1975) and consumer economics
(Lancaster, 1966), this study attempts to
start filling this gap by analyzing which
type and source of GI information diffe-
rentiates an individual producer’s brand
from the others within the same place-
of-origin. To do that, we first distinguis-
hed generic and brand GI information
into two broad categories depending on
the aim and the content of the provided
information. Then, we analyzed the im-
pact of plausible pieces of generic and brand GI informa-
tion treatments on consumer beliefs, attitudes and buying
intentions for competing brands with the same GI label. 
Results lead to two key conclusions. First, generic GI in-
formation including a description of the natural qualities of
the GI region, its association with the food product, and an
explanation of the PDO meaning can be used as a differen-
tiation tool by olive oil producers who want to compete
with other producers from the same place of origin. Path
analysis allows also to explore the causes behind consu-
mers’ differentiation of a producer’s brand providing such a
generic GI information. Respondents have an “affective”
positive reaction, that is, not significantly mediated by
changing perceptions towards the information provider. In
other words, consumers do not react to this type of generic
GI information with higher perceptions of quality for the
producers’ brand. Instead, they react by simply liking the
producer’s brand more than competing brands and this
leads to a higher probability of paying a WTPP. Overall,
this result indicates that – in the case of Riviera Ligure oli-
ve oil with consumers with little prior knowledge, such as
MSU graduate students with an interest for international
food and cuisine – producers may effectively “coopete” by
providing such a generic GI information. More broadly, this
result indicates that complementarity between collective
and individual firms’ communication strategies could be
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of producers on WTPP for “Brand A”.
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achieved with generic GI information when consumers ha-
ve little prior knowledge for the GI region. Limited to the
studied case, this result has implications for producers sel-
ling to novel olive oil consuming regions – for example, the
rapidly expanding East Asian, Middle Eastern, Russian and
East European markets, as well as the North American and
North European markets, whose consumption of olive oil is
still expanding (Giorno et al., 2013). In these markets, pro-
ducers may effectively “coopete” by providing generic GI
information individually rather than organizing themselves
and send generic GI information as a collective entity. 
Second, brand GI information differentiates a brand from
competing brands when consumers have already prior kno-
wledge of the promoted olive oil region. In this experiment,
brand GI information included a large set of brand endorse-
ments from chefs, buyers in famous international stores and
one well-known restaurant guide. Such a variety of brand
endorsements may not be always possible to obtain for food
producers, as developing a network to engage with highly
recognized and influential actors in the food chain may be
challenging and costly (Dentoni and Reardon, 2010). When
receiving brand GI information, consumers had a rational
response to the brand information. That is, consumers re-
ceiving the brand GI information like brand mainly becau-
se they believe that it is associated to higher quality. This
result suggests that providing GI information is an appro-
priate way to compete - although not necessarily to coope-
rate - when consumers have already prior knowledge of the
GI region. In the case of Riviera Ligure, it seems advisable
for producers to provide brand GI informa-
tion within Italy and neighbor countries,
where most of the consumers are already fa-
miliar with the GI region and its olive oil. In
terms of contribution to the literature, this
result complements and integrates recent
findings on olive oil marketing. These
concluded that generic GI information (Me-
napace et al., 2011), expert ratings and sen-
sory product characteristics (Delgado and
Guinard, 2011) and health claims (Finardi et
al., 2009) have an impact on consumer per-
ceptions, attitudes and buying intentions.
Moreover, the results on mediating variables
on the effect of generic and brand GI infor-
mation expand the findings on the effects of
GI labels as cues of overall product quality
(Van del Lans et al., 2001). Finally, results
on demographic moderators on the effect of
GI information on olive oil complements the
findings on the relative importance of olive
oil origin given by different consumer seg-
ments (Scarpa and Del Giudice, 2004; Chan-
Halbrendt et al., 2010).
To drive broader conclusions that contri-
bute to agri-food managers’ marketing and
communication strategies, three points need to be taken in-
to account. First, a number of factors may influence the
content and the effect of generic and GI information on
brand differentiation, including: the nature of the GI pro-
duct (olive oil versus others), the territory (Riviera Ligure
versus others), the type of GI label (PDO versus others), the
region and/or country of origin reputation where the GI is
established (Liguria, Italy versus others) and the consumer
targeted (college students in the USA versus others). There-
fore, results provide an example of how testing this set of
hypotheses can lead to managerial implications, but as such
cannot be generalized to other contexts apart from PDO Ri-
viera Ligure olive oil. Second, the brand GI information
treatments on a Riviera Ligure olive oil brand with PDO la-
bel attached are composed by a set of reported claims from
a heterogeneous set of sources, including retailers, opinion
leaders’ endorsements and food competition awards won.
We estimated the impact of the treatment as a whole, wi-
thout trying to estimate the marginal impact of each piece
of information depending on its source. Estimating the mar-
ginal impact of different reported sources of information
composing brand GI information may also provide insights
on how to develop effective brand GI information. Third,
buying intentions were estimated in terms of WTPP without
attempting a quantification of the price premium. Estima-
ting the impact of GI information on consumer WTP would
provide the basis to financial scenario-building comparing
costs and benefits of developing and providing the discus-
sed types of GI information.
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